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THE JURISDICTIONAL SHADOWLAND BETWEEN THE
NLRB AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD:
WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Shaunta M. Knibb
Abstract: The National Labor Relations Act exempts all persons subject to the Railway
Labor Act (RLA) from its jurisdiction. As a result, for over fifty years the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) has referred challenges to its jurisdiction based on the RLA to the
National Mediation Board, the RLA's administering agency. In 1995, however, the NLRB's
decisions in Federal Express Corp. and United Parcel Service, Inc. cast doubt on this policy.
Even though the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia then affirmed the NLRB's
decision in United Parcel Service, the question of whether the NLRB has the authority to
decide questions of RLA jurisdiction is still an open one. This Comment traces the treatment
of this problem by both the NLRB and federal courts and identifies the analytical
shortcomings in each of these decisions as they relate to the question of who has authority to
determine jurisdiction between the NLRB and the Mediation Board. Based on these
shortcomings, this Comment concludes that the NLRB should refer all arguable claims of
RLA jurisdiction to the Mediation Board for an initial determination.
"You've seen the ads on television: flying delivery trucks speeding
packages across the skies. Is the delivery service an airline or is it a
trucking company?"' The question is more than one of semantics because
this distinction could mean a difference as to which labor law applies to
the delivery service and which federal agency will administer that law.
Complicating matters, doubts exist as to which of two agencies, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 or the National Mediation Board (NMB or
Mediation Board) under the Railway Labor Act (RLA),3 should decide
which of these laws applies. Because their jurisdictions are mutually
exclusive, resolving whether the NLRB or the NMB has authority to
decide this jurisdictional question can have a great bearing on whether
the "flying truck" is an airline or a trucking company. For express
delivery companies that straddle the line between air carriers and
trucking companies, this uncertain regulatory future has the potential to
threaten their competitiveness.
This problem stems from conflicting language in the NLRA and the
RLA. The NLRA excludes from its jurisdiction employers and
1. Frank Swoboda, Is it an Airline by Any Other Name?, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1994, at F2.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1996).
3. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1996).
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employees covered by the RLA4 while the RLA covers railroads, air
carriers, and other employers who provide services in connection with
the transportation and handling of property transported by the railroad or
air carrier.' Trucking services, however, are excluded from the RLA.6
Thus, even though airlines generally are covered by the RLA while
trucking companies are excluded from it, difficulties arise for the NLRB
when a company operates both aircraft and trucks. For example, should
the NLRA or the RLA regulate the employment of persons who unload
packages from an airplane and place them on a truck? What about
dispatchers who coordinate package transfers from truck to plane or
plane to truck? Do these employees work for the airline or trucking
division? To which division are they more integral? More importantly,
when a labor union files a representation petition or grievance with the
NLRB concerning such a company, how should the NLRB resolve the
question of jurisdiction? Should it matter whether the union or employer
makes an arguable claim that the RLA and not the NLRA covers their
employment situation? Does the NLRB in determining the scope of its
own statute have authority to define the limits of the RLA, or has
Congress assigned that role exclusively to the Mediation Board?
For the past fifty years, the NLRB has referred challenges to its
jurisdiction based on the RLA to the Mediation Board for determination.
Nevertheless, in 1995, the NLRB retreated from this long-standing
policy by ruling that henceforth it would refer only those jurisdictional
questions it deemed doubtful or that raised difficult questions of
interpretation under the RLA.7 Two decisions, Federal Express Corp.8
and United Parcel Service, Inc.,9 mark this break from the past.
In both cases the NLRB examined the relationship between the airline
and trucking divisions of the company in question before announcing
whether it had authority to address the threshold question of jurisdiction.
Treating the two corporations differently, the NLRB retained jurisdiction
in United Parcel Service and determined itself whether United Parcel
Service, Inc. (UPS) should be covered by the NLRA or the RLA, while
in Federal Express, it referred the jurisdictional claim to the Mediation
4. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2); see infra note 16 and accompanying text.
5. M. Lee, Labor Board Clarifies Its Jurisdiction Over Air Express Deliery Companies, Cal.
Emp. L. Monitor, Oct. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWLTRS File.
6. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
7. Federal Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1155 (1995).
8. Id.
9. 318 N.L.R.B. 778 (1995).
Vol. 72:241, 1997
Jurisdiction Between the NLRB and the NMB
Board. Each agency ruled in favor of its own jurisdiction. As a result,
two fierce competitors in the express delivery business are now governed
by different labor laws, administered by different agencies, who promote
different labor policies."0
These two cases highlight a growing interagency conflict over who
should decide the respective scope of both the NLRA and the RLA.
NLRB and Mediation Board representatives have discussed the need for
a solution." Thus far, their talks have produced nothing and frustrated
parties such as UPS have threatened to ask Congress for a solution.'
The central question addressed in this Comment is whether the
language of the NLRA excluding RLA subjects from its coverage
authorizes the NLRB to resolve questions of RLA jurisdiction in the
course of deciding the scope of the NLRA. This Comment traces the
treatment of this problem by both the NLRB and federal courts with
particular emphasis on the cases of Federal Express and United Parcel
Service. Part I offers an overview of the different policies underlying the
NLRA and the RLA and then discusses the NLRB's historic handling of
this jurisdictional quandary. Part I ends with a description of Federal
Express and United Parcel Service. Part II critically analyzes these two
opinions, while part III reviews the recent court of appeals decision in
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 3 which affirmed the NLRB's
earlier ruling. Based on a critical analysis of these opinions, this
Comment concludes that the NLRB should refer all arguable claims of
RLA jurisdiction to the Mediation Board for an initial determination.
10. The NLRB has not dismissed the petition involving Federal Express. It is possible that the
NLRB could repudiate the Mediation Board's determination and assert jurisdiction itself. See infra
note 91 and accompanying text.
11. Teamsters Asks Labor Board to Assert its Powers over United Parcel Service, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), Dec. 3, 1994, at D3.
12. Id. Federal Express took steps in 1996 to ensure its continued placement under the RLA's
jurisdiction by successfully lobbying Congress to add the term "express company" back into the
RLA. See Robert Bums, Clinton Signs Air-Safet, Bill Despite Misgivings By Labor, Seattle Times,
Oct. 9, 1996, at All; Mead Jennings, FedEx Fred is top dog, Airline Bus., Nov. 1996, at 82;
William Roberts, Loss of Two Words Stirs Fears at FedEx, J. Com., June 10, 1996, at IA. The term
"express company" was dropped from the RLA when Congress abolished the Interstate Commerce
Commission in late 1995. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803
(1995). This language, however, was in effect when Federal Express and United Parcel Service
were decided by the NLRB. Interestingly, UPS argued it was an express company. United Parcel
Serv., 318 N.L.R1B. at 782. Federal Express did not. The NLRB decided the express company
question in United Parcel Service rather than referring the matter to the Mediation Board, just as it
decided whether UPS was an RLA carrier. Id. at 782-83. Consequently, this issue presents the same
jurisdictional question as does whether the NLRB has authority to interpret the RLA to determine if
UPS is an RLA carrier. This Comment, however, focuses only on the latter issue.
13. 92 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Washington Law Review
I. DETERMINING JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE NLRB AND
THE MEDIATION BOARD
When a union files a representation petition or unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB,'4 both the union and employer have the right to
challenge the Board's jurisdiction under section 2(2) of the NLRA. 15 It
reads:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as ar agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof,
or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq.], as amended from time to time, or any labor organization
(other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization."
Unlike the other exemptions listed in section 2(2), Congress created a
broad exclusion for all parties subject to the RLA. Consequently, to
determine whether an employer is subject to the NLRA, the RLA must
be consulted. RLA section 151, First defines "carrier," the equivalent of
"employer" under the NLRA, to include:
[A]ny express company.., and any company which is directly or
indirectly owned or controlled by or under common control with
any carrier by railroad and which operates any equipment or
facilities or performs any service (other than trucking service) in
connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation,
transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of
property transported by railroad ......
14. The NLRB is responsible for enforcing the labor practices set forth in the NLRA as well as
overseeing representational matters such as establishing bargaining units and conducting elections.
William B. Gould, A Primer on American Labor Law 30 (3d ed. 1993). The Board consists of five
members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(1996).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1996). Representation petitions can also be filed with the Mediation
Board by unions or unaffiliated groups of employees. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1996). Employers
cannot file petitions with the Mediation Board. William E. Thorns & Frank J. Dooley, The Railway
Labor Act and Aviation After Deregulation 146 (1990). Under the RLA, the adjudication of "unfair
labor practices" is left to the courts. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (1996).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (emphasis added). Section 2(3) of the NLRA exempts "any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act" from the definition of employee. 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1996).
17. 45 U.S.C. § 151, First (1996), amended by Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-264, § 1223, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996). When Congress reintroduced the term "express
Vol1. 72:241, 1997
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In 1936 Congress extended this definition to encompass "[e]very
common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce."' 8
Congress has never granted the NLRB power to interpret this or any
other provision of the RLA. 9 The question thus becomes whether the
NLRB itself can resolve jurisdictional questions implicating the RLA or
whether it must refer such issues to the Mediation Board. Neither the
agencies acting in concert, the courts, nor Congress has resolved this
issue. Consequently, this question is the focus of a continuing debate.
A. Policy Differences Between the NLRA and the RLA
Questions of jurisdiction between the NLRB and the Mediation
Board" are critical because the RLA and the NLRA embody distinctly
different labor policies. The RLA's primary goal is "to avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged
therein. ' " Congress intended to achieve this by requiring disputing
parties to engage in an "almost interminable"'22 bargaining and mediation
process.' The Mediation Board has wide discretion to control the
duration and format of mediation. The Mediation Board forbids such
pressure tactics as strikes and lockouts unless it concludes that further
negotiations are futile. Even then, the Mediation Board imposes an
company" into the RLA, see supra note 12, it defined it as "any express company that would have
been subject to subtitle IV of title 49, United States Code, as of December 31, 1995." § 1223, 110
Stat at 3287.
18. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1996)); see International Association of
Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963).
19. Indeed, Congress has placed similar exclusionary language in other NLRA provisions. See 29
U.S.C. § 182 (1996) (exempting "any matter" subject to RLA from chapter III of NLRA).
20. Three members, appointed by the President and representatives of both political parties, sit on
the Mediation Board. 45 U.S.C. § 154, First (1996). The chair position rotates annually among these
members regardless of which political party has control of the Presidency or Congress. Charles M.
Rehmus, Evolution of Legislation Affecting Collective Bargaining in the Railroad and Airline
Industries, in The Railway Labor Act at Fifty 1, 20 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1976). Approximately
25 to 30 mediators recruited from the railroad and airline industries and their unions serve under the
Mediation Board. Rehmus, supra, at 20.
21. 45 U.S.C. § 151a(1996).
22. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969).
23. Beatrice M. Burgoon, Mediation of Railroad & Airline Bargaining Disputes, in The Railway
Labor Act at Fifty 71, 74-80 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1976). The collective bargaining process is
highly structured under the RLA. Parties are required to submit written notices of proposed rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions before initiating negotiations. Collective bargaining then follows
a specific time schedule. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, either party or the NMB, sua
sponte, may initiate mediation. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 378 (1969).
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additional thirty-day cooling-off period.24 This cooling-off period is
usually accompanied by a final NMB-initiated attempt to mediate. As a
result, negotiations and mediation under the RLA are often protracted.26
The Mediation Board's goal is to ensure that negotiations continue until
the parties reach an agreement.
By contrast, the NLRA downplays government involvement in
collective bargaining.27 Section One emphasizes the right of self-
organization with the goal of achieving equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.28 The NLRB does not mediate
negotiations; rather, it regulates conduct by protecting each party's
rights. Thus, where the RLA seeks solutions through mediation29 and
discourages self-help, the NLRA encourages self-help as a persuasive
tactic so long as each party's behavior meets certain norms.30
24. Harry A. Rissetto, Overview of the Railway Labor Act, C941 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, at *9 (Oct. 13,
1994), available in WESTLAW, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CLE Materials File; see 45 U.S.C. § 155, First
(1996). If the dispute threatens a substantial interruption of interstate commerce depriving any part
of the country of essential transportation services, the NMB can further delay the use of self-help by
notifying the President of the deadlock. The President is empowered to create an Emergency Board
to investigate the dispute and issue a report followed by another 30-day period for final negotiations.
See 45 U.S.C. §§ 159-160 (1996).
25. 45 U.S.C. § 155, First (b).
26. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R, 396 U.S. at 149; Brotherhood of Railway Clerks &
Steamship Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966) (noting that RLA
procedures are "purposely long and drawn out").
27. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Ploughshares Into Swords from Buffalo Forge?, 12 Transp. L.J. 219,
227 (1982).
28. Rissetto, supra note 24, at 1; see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). In this respect, the NLRA
recognizes that unions are essential to the bargaining process. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) ("National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling
their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the
employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in
wages, hours, and working conditions."); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 16
(1937) (explaining that "theory of the act is that free opportunity for negotiation ... may bring about
the adjustments and agreements which the act in itself does not attempt to compel").
29. Rehmus, supra note 20, at 8, 16.
30. The NLRB will step in if one party alleges an unfair labor practice such as refusing to bargain,
dismissing employees for union activity, employer support of a company union, secondary boycotts
by unions, and entering into "hot" cargo clauses. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1996). If one cr both of the parties
become disheartened by the other, section 13 of the NLRA recognizes the right to strike: "Nothing in
this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications
on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1996). However, if a strike or lockout "will imperil.., the national
health or safety" the President may temporarily enjoin the action. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1996). A party
must give 60 days notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service before terminating
collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)(a) (1996); Rissettc, supra note 24, at 1.
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The RLA requirement of nationwide unionization in contrast to
locally-formed bargaining units allowed under the NLRA is also a
critical difference between the two statutes.3' Because unionization is
easier among local groups of workers, employers and employees may
perceive the NLRA as protecting labor interests while viewing the RLA
as imposing obstacles.32
B. The NLRB's Approach to Questions of RLA Jurisdiction
From 1943 to 1995 the NLRB followed a policy whereby it referred
most jurisdictional questions concerning the RLA to the Mediation
Board.33 The NLRB recognized the exclusive authority of the Mediation
Board to determine its own jurisdiction.34 This referral policy was based
on the NLRB's decision in Pan American World Airways,35 the seminal
decision on questions ofjurisdiction between it and the Mediation Board.
1. Pan American
Pan American involved a representation dispute between two unions
representing employees at Pan American's Guided Missile Range
Division. One union objected to the NLRB's jurisdiction, claiming that
31. See Rehmus, supra note 20, at 16; see, e.g., International Association of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 7 N.M.B. 162, 164 (1979) (noting that unlike LMPA, RLA requires "crafts or
classes [to be] carrier-wide, without division because of geography").
32. Cf Thorns & Dooley, supra note 15, at 25 (identifying drawbacks of carrier-wide bargaining
units); Airlines: Senate Vote on FAA Legislation Delayed Until Week's End, Lott Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), Oct. 2, 1996, at D21 (stating that many view Federal Express's attempts to amend
legislation as anti-labor).
33. Occasionally, the Board has refused to refer questions of RLA jurisdiction to the NMB. See
infra text accompanying note 45.
34. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, 115 N.L.R.B. 493 (1956); Northwest Airlines, Inc., 47
N.L.R.B. 498 (1943). Congress did not grant the Mediation Board explicit authority to interpret the
RLA; nevertheless, the Mediation Board and federal courts recognize that Congress did vest the
NMB with such implicit and exclusive authority including the power to interpret the definition of
"carrier." See, e.g., United Transportation Union v. United States, 987 F.2d 784, 790 (D.C. Cir.
1993); International Longshoremen's Association v. North Carolina State Ports Auth., 370 F. Supp.
33, 39 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1975); In re Employees of Northwest
Airlines, 2 N.M.B. 19, 20 (1948) (acknowledging absence of explicit statutory language in RLA
granting it power to determine who is employee, but ruling it had jurisdiction by necessary
implication). In addition, the Mediation Board has noted the absence of any statutory basis, explicit
or implicit, to support the contention that Congress has authorized another agency to decide such
questions especially when that agency "on the face of its own statute, has no jurisdiction over air
carriers or their employees." Id. at 25-26.
35. 115 N.L.R.B. 493 (1956).
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Pan American's missile operation was subject to the RLA.36 The NLRB
agreed and declared:
[I]n view of the provisions of Section 2(2) of our Act, excluding
any person from our jurisdiction who is subject to the Railway
Labor Act, "it should be clear that the National Mediation Board,
the agency primarily vested with jurisdiction by the terms of the
Railway Labor Act, has declined to assume jurisdiction over the
operations here involved."'37
The NLRB then referred its record to the Mediation Board for review.3"
After conducting its own analysis, the Mediation Board asserted it had
jurisdiction over the employees at issue.39 The NLRB then dismissed the
union's petition, reaffirming its earlier holding in Northwest Airlines,
Inc.4" that "unless the National Mediation Board definitely declines to
assume jurisdiction over such disputed airline employees, this Board will
not assert jurisdiction."' Thus, under Pan American's "definitely
declines" test, determinations by the Mediation Board were conclusive
on the NLRB.
Pan American's recognition of the Mediation Board's authority to
determine its own jurisdiction may have been due, in part, to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision that same year in Local 25, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co.42 The Court was asked to determine whether a railroad company is
entitled to protection under the NLRA in circumstances unrelated to its
employer-employee relations. The Court said the railroad could file an
unfair labor practice with the NLRB, but cautioned the NLRB that
"[nJeither [the NLRA] [n]or [the Labor Management Relations Act] was
intended to tread upon the ground covered by the Railway Labor Act. '43
Since Pan American, the NLRB has continued to acknowledge that
the Mediation Board, and not itself, is the proper agency to address
36. Id. at 494.
37. Id. at 495 (quoting Northwest Airlines, 47 N.L.tRB. at 498).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 47 N.L.R.B. 498 (1943).
41. Id.
42. 350 U.S. 155, 159 (1956).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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questions of RLA jurisdiction. Even so, the NLRB has rejected any
suggestion that it cannot act before the Mediation Board "definitely
declines" jurisdiction. In place of this test, the NLRB typically has
referred RLA jurisdictional questions to the Mediation Board by stating:
Because of the jurisdictional nature of the question presented here,
we have in this case, as in other similar cases in the past, requested
the National Mediation Board, as the agency primarily vested with
jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act over air carriers and
having primary authority to determine its own jurisdiction, to study
the record in this case and to determine the applicability of the
Railway Labor Act to the Employer.'
Thus, although the rationale for referring questions of RLA jurisdiction
to the Mediation Board has changed from one of conclusive to primary
authority, the NLRB's recognition of the Mediation Board's role in
determining the RLA's scope did not change until 1995.
In a few situations the NLRB resolved RLA jurisdictional questions
itself when it found referral to be either "unnecessary or unjustified."45
For instance, the NLRB has declined to refer questions of RLA
jurisdiction where it has either previously exercised uncontested
jurisdiction over the employer,46 or has found that the employer's
situation was factually consistent with a prior Mediation Board
determination declining RLA jurisdiction.47 The NLRB's recent
44. Northern Air Serv., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 465 (1975) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Arthur
Frommer Enter., Inc., 241 N.LR.B. 1189 (1979); Executive Flight Serv. Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 1142
(1978); Holiday Airlines, 216 N.L.R.B. 19 (1975). Since 1980, the NLRB has further restricted its
rationale for referral by stating, "Accordingly, because of the nature of the jurisdictional question,
we requested that the [Mediation Board] determine the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to the
Employer." Allen Serv. Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1994); Mercury Serv., Inc., 253 N.L.R.B.
466 (1980).
45. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 778,780 (1995).
46. See Local 287, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Emery Air Freight/Airborne Express),
304 N.L.R.B. 119 (1991) (arguing that where NLRB has previously asserted jurisdiction over
employer, NLRA jurisdiction is presumed unless party attacking jurisdiction can show that
employer's operations have changed or that it has become air carrier); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 143
N.L.R.B. 578 (1963). In 1996, the NLRB removed any reference to the word "uncontested." See D
& T Limousine Serv., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 859, 859 (1996).
47. See E.W. Wiggins Airways, 210 N.L.R.B. 996 (1974); Air Cal., 170 N.L.R.B. 18 (1968); cf.
Tri-State Aero, Inc., 9 N.M.B. 356 (1982) (referring RLA jurisdictional question despite previous
Mediation Board determination declining jurisdiction where employer argued its operations had
altered sufficiently to render it common carrier subject to RLA). But see Holiday Airlines, 216
N.L.R.B. at 19 (referring jurisdictional question to Mediation Board even though Mediation Board
had previously declined to assume jurisdiction over employer). The NLRB has also declined to refer
jurisdictional questions to the Mediation Board when the party alleging RLA coverage had failed to
demonstrate any connection between the employee's work and an activity involving airline
249
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decisions in Federal Express and United Parcel Service, however, raise
the possibility that the NLRB has broadened these exceptions, or, at a
minimum, that it will decide many of the jurisdictional questions it
previously referred to the Mediation Board.
2. Federal Express
Federal Express arose when certain of its ground service employees
filed a representation petition with the NLRB seeking to conduct an
election under the NLRA.48 These employees claimed Federal Express's
operations had changed enough to bring them under the NLRA.49 They
asked that the NLRB, and not the Mediation Board, make the initial
determination of jurisdiction.5" Federal Express moved to dismiss,
reminding the NLRB of its air carrier status and the language of section
2(2), which the Board had interpreted in Pan American as requiring
referral."
Characterizing petitioner's jurisdictional claim as "doubtful," the
NLRB referred the issue to the Mediation Board for an advisory
opinion. 2 Unlike its statements in the past, however, the NLRB
explicitly retained the option to overrule the Mediation Board in the
event it disagreed with the result.53 In part, the Board premised its
decision on section 2(2) of the NLRA.54 The Board explained that section
functions. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at 780. The NLRB's characterization of this situation
as an "exception" is a misnomer. When the moving party fails to show that jurisdiction under the
RLA is even plausible, it has not truly implicated the exclusionary language found in section 2(2).
48. Federal Express, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1155. The petition seeks to represent all regular ground
service employees including service agents, international document agents, couriers,
courier/handlers, tractor-trailer drivers, dispatchers, and operations agents. See Federal Express
Corp., 23 N.M.B. 32,48 (1995).
49. Lee, supra note 5. When Federal Express was created in 1973, it described itself as "an air
freight carrier principally engaged in operating an interstate air express service." Federal Express, 23
N.M.B. at 36. By 1978, it began acquiring tractor-trailers to carry the goods initially moved by air.
Id. Petitioners argued that Federal Express's increased use of trucks and the introduction of an
"Express Saver" takes their matter out of the NMB's jurisdiction. See id. at 45.
50. See Federal Express, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1155.
51. Id. The NLRB initially referred Federal Express's claim of RLA jurisdiction to the Mediation
Board for an advisory opinion. After the Union moved to reopen the record to add new evidence, the
NLRB asked the Mediation Board to return the record. The Mediation Board acquiesced before
completing its review of Federal Express's claim. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1156 n.6.
54. Id. at 1155.
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2(2) acted only as a guide and did not mandate referral." It did note,
however, that referral was the better policy, particularly when "very
difficult questions of interpretation under the RLA" were involved. 6 To
do otherwise would diminish the benefits achieved through referral.
5 7
The Board then explained that referral in this case was beneficial because
it: (1) discourages forum shopping; (2) promotes stability; and (3)
furthers the NLRA goal of providing orderly and peaceful procedures in
connection with labor disputes affecting commerce. 8
NLRB Chair William Gould dissented. He claimed that the practice of
referral was an abdication of the Board's obligation to administer and
enforce the NLRA 9 According to Gould, the NLRB had the authority
and responsibility to decide matters involving its own jurisdiction
because sections 2(2) and 2(3) merely restrict the NLRB from expanding
its jurisdiction at the expense of the Mediation Board.6" Consequently,
addressing employment situations "in the shadowlands which lie on
either side of the boundary between the NLRA and the RLA," he argued,
does not offend this exclusionary language.6' Gould also claimed that the
NLRB's prior exceptions to referral were "actually representative of the
Board's general practice with respect to jurisdictional claims involving
the interpretation of other statutes or the decisions of other administrative
agencies.,,62 As an example, Gould noted that the NLRB has interpreted
and applied section (3)(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)63 to
determine which individuals fit the definition of "agricultural laborer"
under section 2(3) of the NLRA. 4 Gould thus found nothing to prevent
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1156.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1158 (Gould, dissenting). In support, Gould noted that the NLRB has never disagreed
with the Mediation Board's determination of jurisdiction. Id. at 1156 (Gould, dissenting). The
Board's opinion countered this statement by noting that the NMB had responsibly discharged its
duties, rendering any further action by the NLRB unnecessary. Id. at 1156. Gould later concurred in
United Parcel Service stating, "I would eliminate the Board's general practice of referring cases
involving RLA jurisdictional claims to the NMB for an initial ruling." United Parcel Serv., Inc., 318
N.L.RB. 778,783 (1995).
60. See Federal Express, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1158 (Gould, dissenting) (construing Local 25,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 350 U.S. 155,
159 (1956)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1156 (Gould, dissenting).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 203(0 (1996).
64. Federal Express, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1157 (Gould, dissenting).
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the NLRB from "applying and interpreting the RLA, its legislative
history, and NMB decisions to the extent necessary to decide whether the
Board or the NMB has jurisdiction over a particular employer or
employee."'65 Accordingly, he regarded the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction,66 mentioned by the majority, as inapplicable to situations
involving interagency relationships and saw no reason for the NLRB to
defer to any agency.67
3. United Parcel Service
United Parcel Service parallels Federal Express with one exception,
the result. Instead of referring an open question of RLA law to the
Mediation Board, the NLRB decided the threshold issue of jurisdiction
itself."
The case arose when a union accused United Parcel Service, Inc.
(UPS) of an unfair labor practice. 9 UPS objected to the NLRB's
jurisdiction and asked the NLRB to refer the dispute to the Mediation
Board. UPS argued that changed circumstances, particularly UPS Co.'s
new status as an NMB certified carrier,7" required referral.7' Ordinarily,
once the Mediation Board determines that an employer is a carrier,
65. Id.
66. Primaryjurisdiction defines the relationship between courts and administrative agencies. Id. at
1156 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 271 (3d ed.
1994)). Generally, "primary jurisdiction in an administrative agency exists when the agency has
specialized policy responsibilities or expertise which should be applied to the dispute." I Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Employee DismissalLaw and Practice § 2.40, at 176 (3d ed. 1992).
67. Federal Express, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1156-57 (Gould, dissenting).
68. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 318 N.L.RtB. 778, 778 (1995).
69. UPS was accused and later found guilty of "maintaining and enfcrcing an overbroad
restriction on off-duty employee access to its premises." Id. at 783.
70. See id at 795. Like UPS, Inc., UPS Co. is a subsidiary of United Parcel Service of America,
Inc. Id. at 778. The Federal Aviation Administration issued UPS Co. an air carrier's operating
certificate in 1988. Id. The NMB then found that UPS Co. was a common carrier by air subject to the
RLA. United Parcel Serv. Co., 17 N.M.B. 77 (1990). UPS, Inc. specializes in the ground
transportation of packages. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.RB. at 778 (noting that 92% of packages
picked up, processed, and delivered by UPS, Inc. travel by ground only whereas remaining 8% are
time sensitive packages requiring some travel by air). UPS Co. depends upon UPS, Inc. to deliver
85% of its time sensitive packages. Id. at 778-79. The remaining air packages move exclusively by
ground transport. Id. at 779.
71. In its post-oral argument brief, UPS also argued that it was an "express company" and
therefore an RLA carrier under section 151, First of the RLA. Id. at 782. The NLRB decided this
question itself instead of referring the issue to the Mediation Board. Id. at 782-83; supra note 12.
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jurisdiction under the RLA is presumed.72 In support, UPS cited two
NMB opinions, 0/0 Truck Sales73 and Florida Express Carrier, Inc.74
The administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that referral was warranted,
resting his decision primarily on the breadth of the language in 0/0
Truck Sales and Florida Express Carrier. Because of this breadth, the
ALJ reasoned that UPS's interpretation of these two cases was not
unjustified and thus should be heard by the Mediation Board.75 The ALJ
also found the rationale of Pan American persuasive.76
The NLRB overruled its ALJ, noting that UPS, Inc. had never before
contested its jurisdiction. As a result, the NLRB placed UPS within an
exception to its referral policy." In support, the NLRB claimed that
departure from its general practice of referring questions of RLA
jurisdiction to the Mediation Board in this instance was necessary to
prevent an "interruption in commerce."78 In doing so, the NLRB
addressed the same case law as its ALJ and held that UPS, Inc. was
subject to the NLRA.79
UPS appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed, holding that UPS did not fall within the scope of the RLA. 0
The court deferred to the NLRB's practice of referral, including
72. See Dana E. Eischen, Representation Disputes and Their Resolution in the Railroad and
Airline Industries, in The Railway Labor Act at Fifty 23,37 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1976).
73. 21 N.M.B. 258 (1994).
74. 16 N.M.B. 407 (1989).
75. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at 797. Both 0/0 Truck Sales and Florida Express set forth
the two-part test used by the NMB to determine whether an employer is a carrier under section 151,
First. See 0/0 Truck Sales, 21 N.M.B. at 266; Florida Express, 16 N.M.B. at 409-10. Under this
test, the NMB first determines whether the nature of the work performed is that traditionally done by
rail or air carrier employees. It then determines whether a common carrier exercises direct or indirect
ownership or control of the employer. 0/0 Truck Sales, 21 N.M.B. at 266. Both parts must be
satisfied before the NMB can assert jurisdiction over the employer. Id. at 268. Even if the test is
satisfied, an employer may be excluded from RLA coverage if it falls within the "trucking
exception" to section 151, First. To survive this exception, an employer must show that its trucking
activity is integrally related to the rail or air transportation activity. Id at 269; see also Northwest
Airlines v. Jackson, 185 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1950) ("[T]he [RLA] was intended to apply only to
transportation activities and that work which bears more than a tenuous, negligible and remote
relationship to the transportation activities.").
76. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at 795. Even though the ALJ decided referral was
necessary, he nevertheless distinguished 0/0 Truck Sales and Florida Express on their facts and
claimed that UPS was subject to the NLRA. Id. at 797.
77. Id. at 780; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
78. UnitedParcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at 781.
79. Id, at 778-79. At the same time, the Board reaffirmed that referral was a beneficial policy. See
id. at 780.
80. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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exceptions, stating the court could interpret but not invent new rules of
law on this issue." Thus the court concluded that the NLRB was under
no obligation to refer UPS's claim of RLA jurisdiction to the Mediation
Board.8
2
II. FEDERAL EXPRESS AND UNITED PARCEL SERVICE: A
CRITIQUE
A. Is the NLRB s Referral Policy in Transition?
Federal Express and United Parcel Service represent a change in the
NLRB's referral policy. The NLRB addressed these two cases together in
oral argument so that it could consider whether and under what
circumstances it should continue to refer arguable claims of RLA
jurisdiction to the Mediation Board.83 Although the NLRB reaffirmed its
general support for referral by rejecting Gould's proposal to eliminate the
Mediation Board's role in resolving these jurisdictional questions, the
NLRB departed from the Pan American standard of referral.' Federal
Express and United Parcel Service have set the stage for a more limited
referral policy and in doing so have left employers, unions, and courts
alike scrambling to discern what criteria will control the NLRB's future
referral policy. This section identifies those portions of Federal Express
and United Parcel Service that evince a change in the Board's referral
policy. It also questions whether the NLRB's rationale for exempting
some RLA jurisdictional issues from Mediation Board review is
consistent with the congressionally designed statutory scheme for labor
relations.
1. The NLRB 's Mixed Position Concerning the Mediation Board's
Primary Authority To Resolve Questions of RLA Jurisdiction
The most significant indication of a change was the Board's statement
in Federal Express that the Mediation Board may not have primary
jurisdiction to resolve questions of RLA jurisdiction. Before Federal
Express, the NLRB had always maintained that the Mediation Board had
81. Id. at 1225-28.
82. Id. at 1228. UPS did not appeal this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
83. Federal Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1155, 1155 (1995).
84. Id. at 1155-56.
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either conclusive or primary authority to decide its own jurisdiction. 5
Hence, the NLRB referred arguable claims of RLA jurisdiction to the
Mediation Board. In Federal Express, however, the NLRB retreated
from this and said it had not and would not resolve whether the
Mediation Board has primary jurisdiction to decide questions of RLA
jurisdiction. 6 Similarly, the Board declared in Federal Express that
section 2(2) of the NLRA did not compel it to refer all questions of RLA
jurisdiction to the Mediation Board.87 In Pan American, the Board had
premised its rationale for referring such questions to the Mediation
Board, in part, on the language of section 2(2).8" Thus, the Board's
statements in Federal Express conflict with those made in Pan American
and its progeny89 and strike at the core of those decisions.9"
More troubling is the effect of the NLRB's conclusion that it has no
obligation to refer questions of RLA jurisdiction to the Mediation Board.
Read literally, the NLRB has demoted the Mediation Board to the status
of an advisory board by implying that it has more expertise than the
Mediation Board in resolving RLA jurisdictional claims.9' This
suggestion is not only inconsistent with statements in Pan American, but
with judicial declarations finding that the NLRA and the RLA were
intended to be "independent and mutually exclusive labor schemes."'92
2. New Terminology To Describe When the NLRB Will Refer RLA
Jurisdictional Questions to the Mediation Board
In Federal Express and United Parcel Service, the NLRB introduced a
variety of terms to describe those instances where it claims referral is
warranted. As a result, it is unclear whether the Board will continue to
follow Pan American by referring most arguable claims of RLA
jurisdiction to the Mediation Board. In addition to citing Pan American
85. See, e.g., Northern Air Serv., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 465 (1975); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
115 N.L.R.B. 493,495 (1956).
86. FederalExpress, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1155.
87. la
88. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 44.
90. For a discussion of Pan American, see supra text accompanying notes 36-42. Gould would
take the NLRB's decision one step further by eliminating referral completely. Federal Express, 317
N.L.R.B. at 1158 (Gould, dissenting).
91. See id. at 1156 n.6 ("[W]e would not automatically and necessarily adopt that [NMB]
determination.").
92. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377
(1969).
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favorably, the NLRB said it would refer jurisdictional questions to the
Mediation Board when faced with (1) very difficult questions of RLA
interpretation,93 (2) doubtful claims of NLRA jurisdiction,94 or (3) de
novo constructions of the RLA.95 Because the Board has not defined
these conditions, it is difficult to know whether they were intended
merely as examples of arguable claims of RLA jurisdiction, or meant to
replace the Pan American standard, thereby limiting the circumstances
when the NLRB will refer RLA jurisdictional questions to the Mediation
Board.
The uncertainties created by the NLRB's explanation of its standards
for referral even confused the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. NLRB.96 Instead of applying
the analysis set forth in Pan American or its progeny, the court created a
new two-part test based on Federal Express for determining the
appropriateness of referral. Under this new test, UPS was required to
show not only that jurisdiction under the NLRA was doubtful, but the
presence of a very difficult question of interpretation under the RLA.97
Indeed, the court never mentioned Pan American or the policy of
referring "arguable" claims of RLA jurisdiction to the Mediation Board.
Consequently, the court's interpretation of Federal Express strongly
suggests that Pan American no longer represents the NLRB's referral
policy.
3. Inconsistency Between United Parcel Service and Federal Express
An inconsistency between Federal Express and United Parcel Service
further indicates that the Board's referral policy is in transition. This
inconsistency pertains to the NLRB's support for referral in general. In
both cases the NLRB declared that it neither wanted to address difficult
questions of RLA law nor make law under the RLA because to do so
would undercut the advantages of referral.9" Yet, the NLRB proceeded to
do just that in United Parcel Service after the Board decided to resolve
93. Federal Express, 317 N.L.RB. at 1155.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1156; see United Parcel Serv., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 778, 781 (1995).
96. 92 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 1226. The court also noted that the NLRB had never asserted jurisdiction over Federal
Express whereas it routinely had asserted jurisdiction over UPS for many years. Id. at 122 1.
98. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at 781; Federal Express, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1156. These
advantages include obtaining the Mediation Board's expertise on RLA matters and avoiding
conflicting agency decisions. See supra text accompanying note 58.
256
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the jurisdictional question itself.99 At issue was whether UPS fell outside
the trucking exception to the RLA."'0 Under this exception, an employer
that otherwise qualifies as a carrier can be excluded from coverage under
the RLA. The Mediation Board has held that an employer can escape the
trucking exception by showing that its trucking services are integral to its
air transportation services. 1 ' The Mediation Board had not, however,
addressed the factual situation posed by UPS. 2 Consequently, the
NLRB's ALJ concluded UPS had presented an arguable claim of RLA
jurisdiction under the exception. The full Board rejected the ALJ's
conclusion and decided this question of first impression itself.'0 3 As a
result, the NLRB construed Mediation Board cases in a way that may
differ from the Mediation Board's interpretation of them, leading to a
potential conflict in construing the trucking exception under the RLA.
B. Exempting Certain RLA Jurisdictional Questions from Referral to
the Mediation Board Is Flawed
Moreover, the NLRB's decision to eliminate referral in any case
where it had previously exercised jurisdiction, uncontested or not, is
flawed."° Adherence to past practice has the potential to treat similarly
structured employers differently and increases the potential for
conflicting agency determinations in direct contradiction to the NLRB's
stated desire to minimize such conflicts. Similarly structured employers
are those who compete in the same industry and engage in similar
99. See United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R1B. at 781-82.
100. Id. at 781-82, 796-97. The trucking exception is contained within the definition of "carrier."
See supra text accompanying note 17.
101. In UPS, Inc.'s case, it had to show that its trucking services were integral to the air
transportation services provided by UPS Co., the UPS airline. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at
781; see supra note 75. A showing of "integral" requires only that the services performed by the
ground company be "essential" to the operation of the airline. See 0/0 Truck Sales, 21 N.M.B. 258,
269 (1994); Florida Express Carrier, Inc., 16 N.M.B. 407, 409 (1989); see also Federal Express
Corp., 23 N.M.B. 32, 74 (1995) ("[W]ithout the functions performed by the employees at issue,
Federal Express could not provide the on-time express delivery required of an air express delivery
service."). The Mediation Board has also stated that ritualistic adherence to past determinations is
not necessarily prudent when contemporary conditions require otherwise. Seaboard Sys.
R.R.-Clinchfield Line, 11 N.M.B. 217,225 (1984).
102. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.R.B. at 797. The NMB's decisions in 0/0 Truck Sales and
Florida Express present the closest analogy to the facts presented by UPS. See supra note 75.
103. United Parcel Serv., 318 N.L.RB. at 778 (adopting AL's original opinion in lieu of AJ's
supplemental decision recommending referral to Mediation Board). The NLRB never addressed its
administrative law judge's supplemental opinion where the ALI expressed concern over the
indeterminate nature of the case law.
104. See, e.g., id. at 780.
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practices. UPS and Federal Express are examples. If an employer similar
to UPS were to come before the Mediation Board, the NMB would have
the opportunity to further explain its holdings in Florida Express and
0/0 Truck Sales and decide whether companies such as UPS warrant
RLA coverage. Because the NLRB and the Mediation Board are
empowered to achieve different policy goals, the potential for
disagreement concerning resolution of RLA jurisdictional issues exists.05
Consequently, the Board's exceptions appear to contradict the intent of
Congress to create separate and independent labor boards for different
industries."l 6 Without the designation of one agreed gatekeeper to
determine which agency has jurisdiction, the likelihood of consistent
decisions decreases while the possibility of forum shopping increases.
III. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE ON APPEAL: THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S
FLAWED ANALYSIS
When UPS appealed the NLRB's decision in United Parcel Service,
Inc. it asked the D.C. Circuit to review two questions: (1) whether the
NLRB had authority to decide if a case raises an issue of RLA
jurisdiction; and (2) whether the NLRB properly concluded that UPS was
an employer under the NLRA rather than an RLA carrier.0 7 The court
found no error with the NLRB in either instance and thereby validated
the NLRB's practice of excluding certain RLA jurisdictional questions
from its referral policy.' The court's decision in United Parcel Service,
Inc. v. NLRB, however, is flawed for several reasons. First, the court
applied the wrong standard of review when it determined that the NLRB
had authority to bypass its referral policy and resolve questions of RLA
jurisdiction itself. Second, the court placed too much emphasis on an
earlier Sixth Circuit decision concerning the NLRB's scope of authority.
Third, the court ignored a relevant U.S. Supreme Court decision that
discussed the relationship between the NLRA and the RLA.
As a prelude to answering the question of whether the NLRB had
authority to resolve RLA jurisdictional questions without input from the
Mediation Board, the D.C. Circuit generally addressed whether the
105. See International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 7 N.M.B. 162, 166
(1979) (noting that NLRB uses different criteria in deciding cases than Mediaticn Board).
106. See infra notes 121, 136.
107. This Comment does not dispute the court's decision that UPS is an employer covered by the
NLRA. Instead, it asks whether the court properly addressed the NLRB's authority to make such
determinations.
108. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Mediation Board had primary jurisdiction °9 to resolve all questions
concerning the RLA's scope. According to UPS, because the Mediation
Board is the RLA's administering agency, it should have primary
jurisdiction to decide challenges to the NLRB's jurisdiction based on the
RLA. The court rejected this argument, claiming that any extension of
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to agency-agency relationships would
be contrary to the policy reasons underlying primary jurisdiction because
it was designed solely to prevent the judiciary from rendering policy
decisions best left to the political branch and agencies.11 The court also
said that primary jurisdiction does not require a federal agency to respect
the policy choices of another agency."'
Although the court's description was technically correct, the court
neglected to examine whether the principles furthered by the doctrine
would be equally applicable to agency-agency relationships."' These
principles are reflected in the NLRB's stated advantages for referral and
include avoiding conflicting determinations and obtaining assistance on
matters within the agency's expertise. If the court had looked beyond the
definition of primary jurisdiction to these rationales, it might not have
dismissed UPS's argument so quickly. As demonstrated by the NLRB's
own opinions prior to Federal Express and United Parcel Service, the
NLRB routinely recognized the Mediation Board's primary authority to
decide its own jurisdiction." 3 Consequently, unlike the D.C. Circuit's
assertion to the contrary, the NLRB, as a federal agency, has found
reasons to respect the policy choices of another agency.
A. The Court's Improper Standard of Review
UPS asked the D.C. Circuit to determine if the NLRB acted arbitrarily
when it declined to refer the question of whether UPS was an RLA
carrier within the meaning of section 151, First.' This was a pure
question of law and accordingly should have been reviewed de novo.
Instead, the court assumed without discussion that it should defer to the
109. Primary jurisdiction is not the same as primary authority. As the D.C. Circuit made clear,
primary jurisdiction is a judicial doctrine used to describe the relationship between the courts and
agencies only. See supra note 66.
110. United Parcel Serv., 92 F.3d at 1225.
111. Id.
112. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. 318 N.L.R.B. 778, 780 (1995); supra text accompanying note
59.
113. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
114. United Parcel Serv., 92 F.3d at 1222.
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NLRB's determination of this question."' The court, thus, recognized the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction over this issue. In doing so. the court used
the NLRB's practice of excepting certain RLA jurisdictional questions
from its referral policy as evidence that the court should not confront the
difficult question of whether the NLRB can unilaterally resolve questions
of RLA jurisdiction without exceeding its statutory authority."6
As a general matter, judicial deference to an agency determination is
guided by two principles: the importance of obtaining superior expertise
in the area in question and the need for uniform statutory and regulatory
interpretations on a subject Congress has entrusted to an agency." 7 If the
question before the court touches one of these principles, deferral is
necessary. If the question is not within the reach of the agency's
expertise, however, then judicial deference is not warranted. Underlying
the rule of deference is the assumption that a single administrative
agency has primary responsibility over a regulatory scheme." 8 Hence, if
a court faces a potential conflict between two agencies, the proper
approach is for the court to determine de novo which agency Congress
intended to resolve the issue.'19 If the court defers to one agency before
answering this question, it runs the risk of contradicting itself in future
cases if the other agency comes before it with a similar issue.
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. NLRB, UPS challenged the NLRB's
authority to exclude questions of RLA jurisdiction from its referral
policy. The question posed a pure question of law implicating not only
the jurisdiction of the NLRB, but that of the Mediation Board.
Consequently, the D.C. Circuit faced an unresolved conflict between the
NLRA and the RLA that required the court to define the outer boundaries
of the NLRA and its relationship with the RLA.' 20 Asking whether the
115. See id. at 1225.
116. See id.
117. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956); Christy Cornell Kunin,
Unilateral Tariff Exculpation in the Era of Competitive Telecommunications, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev.
907,923 (1992).
118. Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 Ala.
L. Rev. 35,36-37 (1991).
119. See ABA Section on Admin. Law, A Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doctrine, 38 Admin.
L. Rev. 235, 236 (1986) (explaining that courts and not agencies have primary authority over issues
of law); see also Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (arguing that where
regulation was written and promulgated by three agencies, possibility of inconsistent interpretations
weakens case for deference).
120. There is some debate about whether Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to agency's construction of its governing statute
if congressional intent is unclear), requires courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute
260
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NLRB's treatment of this issue was arbitrary was in error because it
allowed the NLRB to speak on an issue that it was not created to resolve.
In essence, UPS asked the court to determine the meaning of the
relevant exclusionary language in section 2(2) as it relates to the overall
statutory scheme for labor relations created by Congress. That statutory
scheme is reflected in the language of the NLRA and the RLA. Both the
plain language of the NLRA as well as the separate existence of the
NLRA and the RLA themselves imply that Congress intended for the
NLRB to defer to the Mediation Board when RLA jurisdictional
questions are at issue. Otherwise, the creation of a separate labor statute
for rail and air carriers would have been unnecessary. Moreover, the
language excluding employers and employees subject to the RLA from
the NLRA is a tangible reminder that rail and air carriers represent a
distinct area of labor law that Congress not only carved out of the Labor
Management Relations Act, but provided, by the RLA, techniques
peculiar to those industries."' Determinations of this sort should not be
delegated to administering agencies for it is the "province and duty" of
the judiciary to say what the law is, and "if two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each." '122 Consequently,
delimiting its jurisdiction. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 381
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that rule of deferenca applies even to agency's interpretation
of its own statutory authority "because there is no discernible line between an agency's exceeding its
authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority"); accord Dole v. United
Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 53 (1990) (White, J., dissenting). But see Mississippi Power,
487 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference is inappropriate because scope of
administrative agency's jurisdiction is not decision that Congress normally entrusts to agency);
accord Air Courier Conference of America v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1226 (3d Cir. 1992)
(Becker, J., concurring). This debate is inapposite to the situation here because it assumes that an
agency's interpretation of its governing statute will not impact the jurisdiction of another agency. Cf
ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arguing that courts should perform "close and
searching analysis of congressional intent" when agency's assertion of power into new arenas is
questioned). The question before the D.C. Circuit required a determination of how two agencies
should resolve jurisdictional conflicts between them in circumstances where Congress has indicated
that each agency's jurisdiction was distinct from the other. See Local 25, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 350 U.S. 155, 159 (1956) (recognizing that
NLRA was not intended to overlap with RLA); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters & Joiners, 324 F.2d 217, 221 (9th Cir. 1963) (quoting California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553, 565-66 (1957), and noting that LMRA is distinct and separate statute from RLA).
121. Pan Am., 324 F.2d at 221 (quoting Taylor, 353 U.S. at 565-66). See also United States v.
Davidoff, 359 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court noted that although the Labor
Management Relations Act was enacted after the RLA, it was not intended to impinge upon or cover
the same ground as the RLA. Consequently, the court explained, Congress carved out the exceptions
to the definitions of "employer" and "employee" in the NLRA. Id. at 547.
122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); see Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947) (determining whether NLRB acted within terms of NLRA is
question of law to be determined de novo); cf Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,
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the court abdicated its responsibility by deferring to the NLRB's decision
on this crucial point.
This pure question of law, whether the NLRB has authority to resolve
conflicts between itself and the Mediation Board by assuming the
authority to resolve questions of RLA jurisdiction conclusively, is
distinguishable from cases where the courts have examined the NLRB's
decisions to interpret another statute in order to carry out the mandates of
the NLRA.'23 In the former instance, the NLRB is not merely borrowing
the definition of "carrier." Rather, any decision by the NLRB directly
affects the ability of the Mediation Board to carry out its duties under the
RLA. Consequently, despite Gould's arguments to the contrary in his
Federal Express dissent, the NLRB's treatment of agricultural laborers is
not analogous because Congress has not ordered the NLRB to interpret
the RLA. 24 Borrowing the definition of "agricultural laborer" does not
implicate the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, the agency that
administers the FLSA. In large part, this is due to a congressional
directive ordering the NLRB to determine jurisdictional issues involving
agricultural laborers in a specific manner.'25 Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that it must respect NLRB interpretations of the
FLSA. It did so, however, in the context of this congressional mandate.'26
Congress therefore has forced the NLRB not only to determine who
qualifies as an "agricultural laborer," but to use the FLSA when doing so.
By contrast, Congress has not directed the NLRB to interpret the
RLA. Instead, Congress has exempted employers and employees subject
to the RLA from the NLRA." 7 Because questions of jurisdiction
necessarily affect the substantive application of the RLA, it is unlikely
464 U.S. 89, 98 (1983) ("When an agency's decision is premised on its understanding of a specific
congressional intent.., it engages in the quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute
means.... [B]ut [the agency's interpretation] cannot bind a court."); Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 827 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), mandates de novo review for questions of
law).
123. See, e.g., Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 302 (1977) (examining NLRB's
decision to borrow definition from NLRA in terms of its reasonableness).
124. See supra text accompanying note 63.
125. Since 1946, Congress has attached riders to the Appropriations Acts for the Board, tying the
definition of "agricultural laborers" in section 2(3) of the NLRA to section 3(f) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (1996).
126. See Bayside Enters., 429 U.S. at 302.
127. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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that Congress intended to include their resolution solely within the
jurisdiction of the NLRB. 2'
B. The Court's Misplaced Reliance on Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB
The D.C. Circuit's misplaced reliance on Dobbs Houses, Inc. v.
NLRB' 29 may have caused it to apply the wrong standard of review.
Dobbs Houses appealed to the Sixth Circuit from an NLRB decision
rejecting its claim of coverage under the RLA. On appeal, Dobbs Houses
renewed its primary argument that it was subject to the RLA, not the
NLRA. It also claimed that the NLRB should have let the Mediation
Board make the initial determination of jurisdiction.3 ' The Sixth Circuit
devoted most of its attention to the first argument and barely considered
the question of whether the NLRB or the Mediation Board has
jurisdiction to determine which of the two agencies can resolve RLA
jurisdictional questions. 3' Indeed, the Sixth Circuit's entire coverage of
this point was contained in one sentence, where it said: "Concededly,
there is no statutory requirement that this question of jurisdiction be
submitted for an answer first to the National Mediation Board."'32 The
Sixth Circuit cited no authority and offered no explanation for this
conclusion. Consequently, when the D.C. Circuit relied on Dobbs
Houses to show that UPS had identified no sound basis on which to order
the NLRB to refer RLA jurisdictional questions to the Mediation
Board,'33 the court neglected its responsibilities in the same manner as
the Sixth Circuit: it failed to examine the question of which agency
should first decide the jurisdictional issue. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit
never explained why the NLRB would have more authority or expertise
in this area than itself and thus did not justify its decision to defer to the
NLRB. 134
128. See supra text accompanying note 43.
129. 443 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1971).
130. Id. at 1067.
131. See id. at 1067-72.
132. Id. at 1072.
133. United Parcel Serv., Inc., v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1221, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
134. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 467
(1987) (arguing that deference to administrators' decisions regarding scope of their own jurisdiction
violates separation of powers principles).
Washington Law Review
C. The Court Failed To Examine International Brotherhood of
Teamsters
More importantly, the D.C. Circuit ignored the U.S. Supreme Court's
admonishment in Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., that "[n]either [the
NLRA] [n]or [the Labor Management Relations Act] was intended to
tread upon the ground covered by the Railway Labor Act.' 135 This
warning compels the NLRB not to construe the NLRA in such a way as
to limit the RLA's scope. Whenever the NLRB faces a situation where a
party claims it is covered by the RLA, the NLRB must ensure that it does
not constrict the RLA. Merely because the NLRB is the forum where this
question arises, does not mean it is any more a question of the NLRB's
jurisdiction than of the Mediation Board's. It is a debate about the
boundaries between two independent and mutually exclusive
jurisdictions. 136 Thus, if the NLRB determines an RLA jurisdictional
issue without input from the Mediation Board, the NLRB, in effect,
assumes duties assigned to the Mediation Board and treads upon the
RLA. The D.C. Circuit's failure to reconcile this U.S. Supreme Court
mandate with the NLRB's refusal to refer some arguable claims of RLA
jurisdiction to the Mediation Board is an abdication of the court's
responsibility.'37
In addition to examining International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
D.C. Circuit should have considered the legislative histories of both the
NLRA138 and the RLA, the problems associated with and the possibility
135. Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
R.R, 350 U.S. 155, 159 (1956).
136. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377 (1969)
(explaining that NLRA and RLA were intended to be "independent and mutually exclusive labor
schemes"). Similarly, the Court noted in International Brotherhood of Teamsters that "neither
railroads nor their employees may carry their grievances with one another t: the N.L.RtB. for
resolution," and thus indicated that the NLRB does not have the authority to resolve labor disputes
between RLA carriers and their employees. 350 U.S. at 159.
137. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (stating that courts are
obligated to say what law is).
138. The NLRA's legislative history contains support for UPS's contention that the Board must
refer RLA jurisdictional claims to the Mediation Board. After explaining that the NLRB was
designed to act as the "supreme labor board" over all existing labor boards, fcrmer NLRB Chair,
Lloyd R. Garrison, testified that the Railroad Labor Board, the precursor to the National Mediation
Board, was the exception and should remain free from the NLRB's reach. A Bill to Promote Equality
ofBargaining Power Between Employers and Employees, to Diminish the Causes ofLabor Disputes,
to Create a National Labor Relations Board, and for Other Purposes, Hearings on S. 1958 Before
the Senate Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 74th Cong. 134 (1935), reprinted in I NLRB, Legislative
History of the National Labor Relations Act 1514 (1949).
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of conflicting agency determinations if one gatekeeper is not
recognized, 39 and whether Gould's proposal to eliminate the Board's
policy of referral would be permissible in light of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Although not conclusive individually,
together these considerations provide strong reasons for a narrow reading
of the NLRA's exclusion of parties covered by the RLA. Consequently,
the D.C. Circuit's claim that there was no "legal or logical basis"'40 for it
to order the NLRB to refer RLA jurisdictional questions to the Mediation
Board was not only rash, but suspect.'
As a result of the D.C. Circuit's omissions in United Parcel Service,
Inc. v. NLRB and the NLRB's current referral policy, employers or
unions who raise RLA jurisdictional claims before the NLRB face
substantial uncertainty. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit's reasoning leaves
so many questions unanswered that the next court to address them may
well be justified in limiting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. NLRB to its
facts and undertaking the full consideration this question deserves.
Barring that, frustrated companies will likely resort to Congress. 1
42
IV. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by United Parcel Service, Inc. v. NLRB, de novo judicial
review of NLRB determinations of RLA jurisdictional questions is
essential in order to prevent the NLRB from arrogating duties assigned to
the Mediation Board. This solution, however, is not ideal because it fails
to address the underlying issue of whether the NLRB must be afforded
an opportunity to speak on matters of RLA jurisdiction that are presented
to the NLRB. Even if a court invites the Mediation Board to file an
amicus curiae brief, the NMB's voice has been marginalized. "Friends of
the court" are simply not accorded the same respect or procedural
opportunities as parties.143 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
139. For a comprehensive discussion about the effect of deference upon interagency conflicts, see
Weaver, supra note 118, at 35.
140. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
141. Even NLRB Chair William Gould addressed the U.S. Supreme Court's warning in his
Federal Express dissent. He argued that the Court's admonishment means only that the NLRB may
not expand its jurisdiction at the expense of the Mediation Board. See Federal Express Corp., 317
N.L.R.B. 1155, 1158 (1995) (Gould, dissenting). Interpreting the RLA for purposes of determining
jurisdiction between the two agencies, according to Gould, does not cross that line. Id.
142. See supra note 12.
143. Ordinarily, amici cannot submit reply briefs or participate in oral argument. See Fed. P- App.
P. 29 (noting that motion to participate in oral argument by amicus curiae will only be granted for
extraordinary reasons); 16A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3975,
Washington Law Review
declaration in International Brotherhood of Teamsters that the NLRA is
not to tread upon the RLA, it seems unlikely that Congress intended for
the NLRB to decide unilaterally RLA jurisdictional issues.
Consequently, the NLRB should refer all arguable claims of RLA
jurisdiction to the Mediation Board for an initial deteraination. If the
NLRB disagrees with this determination, then the court of appeals should
resolve the matter de novo upon receiving a petition for review by one of
the parties.
This approach eliminates the gatekeeper problem by allowing both the
NLRB and the Mediation Board to participate in determining their
respective jurisdictions. Moreover, it recognizes that any disagreement
between the two agencies represents an unsettled question of law about
the boundaries between two independent labor schemes ilhat the federal
courts are best designed to resolve.
3975.1 (1996) (stating that Rule 29 has no provision permitting amicus curiae to file reply or
supplemental briefs and that amicus curiae have no standing to seek review by U.S. Supreme Court
of any judgment adverse to its interests, even if brief is accepted by court of appeals); see also
Alexander Wohl, Friends with Agendas, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 46, 46 (arguing that amicus curiae
briefs are over used and consequently, have lost much of their persuasive power). Amici, thus, are
placed at a procedural disadvantage.
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